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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether evidence of the non-use of a seat 
belt by the plaintiff should have been allowed by the trial 
court. 
II. Whether the jury's use of extraneous 
evidence, a dictionary, to define the word "proximate11 was 
reversible error. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
1 
Hillier v. Lamborn, 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, (Ct. App. 
08/05/87), 740 P.2d 300 (Utah App. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
On August 5, 1987, the Utah Court of Appeals entered 
its Opinion affirming the decision of the trial court. 
Subsequent to that time, the appellant, William J. Lamborn, 
filed his Petition for Rehearing. An Order Denying the 
Petition for Rehearing was entered on the 2 6th day of August, 
1987. Subsequent to that time, an Order granting the appellant 
an extension of time to and including October 9, 1987, was 
entered on the 25th day of September, 1987. This Court has 
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals by 
Writ of Certiorari pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(5) (effective 
through December 31, 1987). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
This Court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-27-37 (1973) amended by Utah Code Ann, §§ 78-27-37, 38 
(1986) may be controlling as to whether this Court should 
review the Opinion of the Court of Appeals and remand for a new 
trial: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar 
recovery in an action by any person or his 
legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence or gross negligence resulting in 
death or in injury to person or property, 
if such negligence was not as great as the 
negligence or gross negligence of the 
person against whom recovery is sought, but 
any damages allowed shall be diminished in 
the proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person recovering. As 
used in this act, "contributory negligence" 
includes "assumption of the risk." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
This was an action for personal injuries and property 
damage suffered by the plaintiff-respondent, Karen Hillier 
(hereinafter "Hillier" or "plaintiff"), against 
defendant-appellant, John Lamborn (hereinafter "Lamborn" or 
"defendant"). The action arose as a result of an automobile 
accident which occurred on a frontage road between Farmington 
and Centerville, Davis County, Utah, in November of 1983. A 
jury trial was held on the matter and a verdict was entered 
against the defendant Lamborn which resulted in a total 
judgment amount of $221,209.41. The defendant John Lamborn 
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then appealed from the Judgment. Initially, the appeal was 
filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, but subsequent 
t > 1;,h€'" crea' Utah C : i ri: t: of Appeals, the case was sent 
to the Utah . c,.:. . Appeals for disposition On A ug ust 5,, 
1987 # the Utah Court ^f Appeals entered its Opinion affirming 
the decision of the * - our". The plaintiff then petitioned 
1" i ic: :i i :i :j, u h :i : P. i i :j u s t 2 6 , ] 9 8 7 A n 
extension of ti me unti 1 October 9 , 1 98 7, for the f i ling of 
Lamborn's Petition for Certiorari was granted by th is Court, 
Statement of Facts 
facts ~ "" - pertinent to the defendant's 
appea -r - follows: s* - :s t : record; T. stands for 
3 .il».il 2' I." T O O / a -^iiv^r +- -K ,
 W a S 
held the Second District Cour' r* Davis County, Judge 
) 
; ..:.'.. , rought suit 
allegedly suffered when involved in an automobile accident with 
a pickup truck driven by the defendant. (R. 1-10.) 
3 Thp p 1 d i rut. J 1 t suuqlit sptu j A 1 nil,unages lot II 
medical and other out-of-pocket expenses she incurred and 
general damages for her alleged pai n and suffering. (R, 1-1 0.) 
4 rhe major issue during the trial of thi s 
matter centered upon the quest I on c £ 1 :i ab i 1 :i ti '" I'u f I i,a t: ei id 
both parties introduced eye witness testimony, expert 
3 
testimony, and physical evidence designed to support the 
respective theories of the case. (T. 1-617.) 
5. The defendant introduced a significant amount 
of evidence that tended to show that the plaintiff negligently 
contributed to the cause of the accident and consequently was 
responsible for her injuries. (T. 348-520.) 
6. Also, during the course of the trial, the 
defendant argued that he should be allowed to introduce 
testimony and other evidence to the effect that the plaintiff 
was not wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident. The 
defendant sought to show through expert testimony that as a 
result of the plaintiff's failure to use an available seat 
belt, her injuries were far more severe than they would have 
been otherwise. (R. 208.) 
7. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
plaintiff's attorney first broached the subject of the 
plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt by asking her 
on direct examination whether or not she was wearing a seat 
belt, in direct contravention to a pretrial order by the judge 
prohibiting any such evidence, the defendant's counsel was 
prevented by the court from introducing the above-referenced 
seat belt testimony. (R. 175.) 
8. Also, the defendant's counsel was prohibited 
from submitting to the jury instructions with regard to the use 
of seat belts. (T. 595-96.) 
9. After the jury had retired for a period of 
time, one or all of the jurors requested that the bailiff 
4 
provide them with lictionary Evidently, the jury intended 
tn utc; and ihil I.I lirtini r > tm 111*-1 pni posp \\\ ih'tinirni 
the legal term "proximate" i n order to gain a better 
understanding of the legal ter m "proximate cause," which had 
all r eady beei 1 provided in ury instructions submitted to it 
prior to the time i t ret" . (R, 3 99 4 01|.) • , 
] 0 The j entered its verdict in an amount i" 
excess of $2C 0,000.00 A Judgment was prepared and entered :-
New Trial, Or i n the Alternate we, For the Remission I of Damages 
which was denied by the trial court (R. 387 ) 
•' ''' 1 1 ?s i i appeal followed that denial. (R. 404.) 
' ' '•'• ] 2 Oi ) Aug us t 5, 1 98 3 , tl le Utah Cour t of Appeals 
affirmed the Judgment of the trial cour t. Following that, the 
defendant's Petition for Rehearing was deitied on August 26, 
; '* - (Appe .1 id :i x " ,?» ) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE OF THE NON-USE OF A SE^T BELT BY THE 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED. 
Rule -* * r the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court state that review sf certiorari may be 
in order whei l panel "ie 'tyjrt Appeals has decided a 
question of S* • . it is in i uni Ii 
a decision of the Supreme Court m wlitMi the Court of Appeals 
has decided -v important question ot State law which has not 
b e e i I , bi i t s I be , s e t::t:J e d I: } i in Mipi (Mine I n u n I n t in i >•; 
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case, the issue of whether evidence that a party was not 
wearing a seat belt should go to the jury was decided by the 
Court of Appeals, That decision by the Court of Appeals 
should, because of its importance, be decided by this Court. 
Further, it appears that the decision of the Court of Appeals 
may be in conflict with the decision in Acculog, Inc. v. 
Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984) and with U.C.A. § 78-27-37 
(1953 as amended). Specifically, the concurring Opinion of 
Justice Oakes sheds significant doubt on the finding of the 
Court of Appeals. 
A. It Was an Error in Law to Prohibit the 
Defendant From Introducing Seat Belt Testimony 
and in Failing to Submit to the Jury the 
Defendant's Proffered Seat Belt Instruction. 
The defendant should have been allowed to introduce 
seat belt testimony under the comparative negligence scheme of 
the State of Utah. The comparative negligence scheme upon 
which Utah courts functioned for purposes of this appeal is 
found within the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 
(1973) amended by Utah Code Ann., §§ 78-27-37, 38 (1986), 
which states as follows: 
Contributory negligence shall not bar 
recovery in an action by any person or his 
legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence or gross negligence resulting in 
death or in injury to person or property, 
if such negligence was not as great as the 
negligence or gross negligence of the 
person against whom recovery is sought, but 
any damages allowed should be diminished 
in the proportion to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the person 
recovering. As used in this act, 
"contributory negligence" includes 
"assumption of the risk." 
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(Emphasis added.) It should be noted that the terms of this 
statute do not limit the apportionment of negligence to the 
parties on the basis of the negligence of a party attributable 
to a particular act or to a particular occurrence, but on the 
basis of the negligence attributable to the damages caused by a 
particular party. In other words, the provisions of former 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 do not require that the negligence 
by which the amount of an award will be reduced be the 
negligence that caused the accident, but rather, the negligence 
can also be the negligence that contributed to or caused the 
damages suffered by a plaintiff. Further, this is completely 
consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 465 
Comment c, which provides that damages may be apportioned 
between the defendant and the plaintiff 
Where the antecedent negligence of the 
plaintiff is found not to contribute in any 
way to the original accident, but to be a 
substantial contributing factor in 
increasing the harm which ensues. 
The defendant cited the above-language to the trial 
court in a Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion 
in Limine to exclude all evidence relating to seat belts. (R. 
208, 210.) Basically, with regard to the seat belt testimony, 
it is the defendant's position that this is really an avoidable 
consequences problem, a question of fact that should have been 
submitted to the jury for determination. The defendant 
intended to show at trial that the plaintiff's failure to wear 
an available seat belt caused the majority of her injuries. 
7 
Justice Oaks in the relatively recent case of 
Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984), set out 
guidelines for how district courts should handle the issue of 
apportionment of damages in cases where the negligence of the 
recovering plaintiff did not in fact contribute to the cause of 
the accident but did contribute to the damages incurred. It is 
also interesting to note that Justice Oaks, as the defendant 
did, cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 465 Comment c 
(1975) in support of his position. 
In Acculog, the plaintiff's van, equipped with 
special geological equipment, caught fire and was destroyed on 
the same day that the defendant Peterson had installed a new 
fuel filter to correct over-heating in the engine. The 
plaintiff claimed substantial damages as a result of 
destruction of the van and the special equipment in the van, as 
well as lost profits. Evidently, the plaintiff did not carry a 
fire extinguisher in its van. A special verdict containing 
five interrogatories was submitted to the jury. Apparently, as 
a result of the special verdict, the jury determined that the 
plaintiffs were responsible for the damage to their vehicle 
because they failed to carry a fire distinguisher, 
notwithstanding the defendant's evident responsibility for the 
cause of the fire. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to 
the trial court and specifically held that the trial court had 
committed prejudicial error in submitting to the jury the 
question of the plaintiff's comparative negligence. However, 
the court also expressly did not address the issue of 
8 
mitigation of damages or what is sometimes called the doctrine 
of avoidable consequences. However, in the concurring opinion, 
Justice Oaks, as noted above, set out a scheme for determining 
how the district court should handle the issue of apportionment 
of damages at the new trial. 
Justice Oakes noted that first the negligence of both 
the plaintiff and the defendant, which resulted in the actual 
accident itself, were to be compared in a fashion consistent 
with former Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37. The trier of fact was 
to determine what damages the plaintiff would be allowed to 
recover, diminished in an amount proportional to the amount of 
negligence attributable to the plaintiff. In other words, the 
jury was to determine as to the cause of the accident the 
respective percentages of negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff and on the part of the defendant. 
Next, Justice Oaks said the jury would need to 
determine whether or not the plaintiff negligently failed to 
avoid the damages incurred because of the accident. If the 
plaintiff negligently failed to avoid such damages, then the 
plaintiff's award should be reduced by the amount of damages 
that the plaintiff would not have suffered if the plaintiff had 
not acted negligently in failing to avoid the consequences of 
the original accident. This result is reasonable and not 
contrary to the Utah Comparative Negligence Statute, which in 
fact would seem to mandate such an approach. Further, the 
concurrence of Justice Oaks is not in conflict with the 
9 
majority opinion which reserved the determination on the 
avoidable consequences problem until another time. 
Evidence of whether or not the defendant was wearing 
her seat belt should have been admitted during the trial of 
this matter. Many courts now treat a failure to use seat belts 
as an avoidable consequences problem, holding that failure to 
wear an available seat belt, which results in the aggravation 
of injuries, may result in a reduction of recoverable damages. 
Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 SO.2d 447 
(Fla. 1984); Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 
335 N.W. 2d 824 (1983); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 
N.E. 2d 164 (1974); Elchorn v. Olsen, 35 N.E. 2d 774 (1975); 
Wilson v. Volkswagon of America, 445 F.Supp. 1368 (D. Va. 
1978); Kassela v. Stovitsch, 373 N.Y. 2d 601 (1972); Pritts 
v. Walter Lowry Trucking Co., 400 F.Supp. 867 (D. Pa. 1975); 
Langford v. Chrysler Motors, 513 F.2d 1121 (1975); Henderson 
v. United States, 429 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1970); Uresky v. 
Fedora, 27 Con. Supp. 498, 245 A.2d 393 (1968); Hurnkey v. 
Cornett Ins. Co., 72 Wis. 3d 170, 240 N.W. 2d 382 (1976); 
Glover v. Daniels, 310 F.Supp. 760 (D. Miss. 1970); Thomas 
v. Goodman, 372 A.2d 378 (1977); Benner v. Interstate 
Container Corp., 73 F.R.D. 502 (D. Penn. 1977); Latta v. 
Siefke, 401 N.Y.S. 2d 937 (1978); Noth v. Scheurer, 385 
F.Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Remington v. Arndt, 28 Con. Supp. 
289, 259 A.2d 145 (Conn. Super. 1969); Fintenot v. Fidelity & 
Gas Co., 217 So.2d 702 (La. App. 1969); Sonnier v. Ramsey, 
10 
424 S.W. 2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) and Tom Brown Drilling 
Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W. 2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). 
Other states which have comparative negligence 
statutes have allowed the introduction of evidence that 
indicated that seat belts were available to the injured 
plaintiff and that there was a causal relationship between the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff and the plaintiff's failure 
to use seat belts. Those courts have also allowed jury 
instructions with regard to avoidable consequences if seat 
belts had been worn. See Bentzler v. Brauh, 34 Wis. 2d 362 
(1967); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444 (1974); Pritz v. 
Walter Lawry Trucking Co., 400 F.Supp. 867 (W.D. Penn. 1975); 
and Wilson v. Volkswagon of American, Inc.f 445 F.Supp. 1368 
(E.D. Va. 1978). 
B. There is a Valid Doctrinal Basis for Allowing 
the Seat Belt Defense in Utah. 
Although it may be argued that the seat belt defense 
does not fit neatly into existing tort doctrine, there is 
no reasonable basis to exclude it at trial. The Utah Court of 
Appeals evidently completely ignored this aspect of defendant's 
argument. In fact, the Court of Appeals devoted only two small 
paragraphs; one of which consisted of a string cite of cases, 
some of which are inapposite and not applicable to the question 
at hand. 
Dean Prosser recognized that although evidence 
relative to the seat belt defense does not necessarily fit 
11 
conveniently within traditional tort doctrines, it nevertheless 
is more reasonable to admit it than to exclude it. He said: 
The more difficult problem is presented 
when the plaintiff's prior conduct is found 
to have played no part in bringing about an 
impact or accident, but to have aggravated 
the ensuing damages. In such cases, [some 
courts] have apportioned the damages, 
holding that the plaintiff's recovery will 
be reduced to the extent that they have 
been aggravated by his own antecedent 
negligence. This would seem to be the 
better view, unless we are to place an 
entirely artificial emphasis upon the 
moment of impact, and the pure mechanics of 
causation. 
W. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 65 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis 
added). Also, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, adopts a 
similar view, besides that as presented in § 465, Comment c. 
In § 433A, apportionment of harm to causes, the Restatement 
says: 
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned 
among two or more causes where 
(a) There are distinct harms, or 
(b) There is a reasonable basis for 
determining the contribution of each 
cause to a single harm. 
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be 
apportioned among two or more causes. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433A (1965) (emphasis added). 
Explanatory Comment c to the above-quoted section 
goes on to say: 
Such apportionment may also be made where 
the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff 
is found not to contribute in any way to 
the original accident or injury, but to be 
a substantial contributing factor in 
increasing the harm which ensues. There 
must of course be satisfactory evidence to 
12 
support such a finding, and the court may 
properly refuse to permit the apportionment 
on the basis of mere speculation* 
In the case at hand, the defendant proffered expert 
testimony as to the consequential damages of plaintiff's 
failure to wear an available seat belt. Clearly, the defendant 
met the prerequisites of § 433A and § 465 of the Restatement, 
as well as the policy requirements of Prosper. The 
Restatement and Prosser apportionment rule, as stated 
above, are consistent with what the seat belt defense stands 
for. Non-use of an available seat belt does not entitle the 
defendant, as a matter of law, to a reduction of the 
plaintiff's damages, but the defendant is tfiven the 
opportunity to demonstrate to the jury's satisfaction that the 
plaintiff's conduct contributed to the actual damage she 
suffered. Further, the avoidable consequences doctrine or 
apportionment rules have been applied in non-seat belt 
situations. See e.g., Dean v. Holland, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 
859 (1973); and Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 tf.W. 2d 118 
(N.D. 1983). 
Also, certain judicial opinions which cite a lack of 
duty on the part of the plaintiff to wear an available seat 
belt, because of the fact that common practice indicates that 
most drivers and passengers do not wear an available seat belt, 
lack a defensible foundation in logic or in law. Certainly, it 
is true that absent a mandatory seat belt use law there is no 
violation of a statutory duty, and consequently, no negligence 
per se, but that does not vitiate the "reasonable person" 
13 
standard of common law negligence. It cannot responsibly be 
argued that in 1983, the vast majority of motor vehicle 
occupants did not know the incontrovertible safety value of 
motor vehicle seat belts. 
Parenthetically, the seat belt law currently in force 
in the State of Utah is probably inapplicable to the case at 
hand for two reasons: First, it was enacted subsequent to the 
accident which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, and 
second, it was not passed by a two-thirds majority of both 
houses of the Legislature. The seat belt law as currently set 
out provides that evidence of the failure to use a seat belt 
may not be utilized in a civil action. The Utah Constitution 
clearly provides that an amendment to the rules of evidence may 
only be made by a two-thirds vote of each House. The right 
to issue a new rule of evidence is reserved to the Supreme 
Court. (Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4.) The seat belt act was 
not passed by a two-thirds majority in either House. 
Persons who fail to expend the minimal effort 
required to engage a seat belt are not acting reasonably and 
should not be rewarded for their non-feasance. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court said as early as 19 67 that: 
[w]hile we agree with those courts that 
have concluded that it is not negligence 
per se to fail to use seat belts where the 
only statutory standard is one that 
requires the installation of the seat belts 
in the vehicle, we nevertheless conclude 
that there is a duty, based on the common 
law standard of ordinary care, to use 
available seat belts independent of any 
statutory mandate. 
14 
On the basis of [certain accident 
statistics], it is a matter of common 
knowledge, an occupant of an automobile 
either knows or should know of the 
additional safety factor produced by the 
use of seat belts, 
Bentzler v, Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639, 640 (Wis. 1967). 
Also, the common practice of failing to engage an 
available seat belt is not dispositive on what constitutes 
reasonable behavior by automobile users. The fact that the 
majority of people fail to use seat belts does not make that 
action reasonable. This is especially true when the majority's 
behavior involves unnecessary risks. Again, Prosser terms 
such behavior "customary negligence." W. Prosser, Law of 
Torts, § 33 (4th ed. 1971). The common law standard of 
reasonableness is not an actual standard, but one to which 
people ought to aspire. Judge Learned Hand made this clear 
when he said: 
Indeed, in most cases, reasonable prudence 
is in fact common prudence; but strictly it 
is never its measure; a whole calling may 
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new 
and available devices. It never may set 
its own tests, however, persuasive be its 
usages. Courts must in the end say what is 
required; there are precautions so 
imperative that even their universal 
disregard will not excuse their omission. 
The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 
C. Seat Belt Testimony Should Hgtve Been Admitted 
as Curative Evidence. 
Prior to the trial of the action, the judge of the 
trial court instructed both parties to introduce no evidence 
with regard to seat belts until such time as both parties 
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had the opportunity to brief the issue, present the briefs to 
the court and argue the respective positions outside the 
presence of the jury. However, prior to the time set aside for 
the argument of the seat belt issue, the attorney for the 
plaintiff broached the issue. 
Utah follows a rule of evidence permitting "curative 
evidence" to be forwarded by a party when the opposition 
presents irrelevant or inadmissible evidence. In Leger v. 
Roberts, 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the admission of otherwise irrelevant evidence, 
determining: 
We see no error in the trial court having 
admitted the evidence, particularly since 
one of Leger's witnesses, who appeared to 
be an expert, opened the matter up and thus 
made it a legitimate target for 
cross-examination. 
Id. at 215. See also, Millford State Bank v. 
Westfield Canal & Irrigation Co., 162 P.2d 101 (Utah 1945). 
The Utah Court of Appeals did not even address this 
issue in its Opinion. The defendant vigorously urges the Court 
to consider this and all other issues relevant to the seat belt 
argument. 
POINT II 
THE JURY'S USE OF EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE, A DICTIONARY, 
TO DEFINE THE WORD "PROXIMATE,11 ENTITLED THE 
DEFENDANT TO A NEW TRIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the jury 
evidently requested the bailiff provide them with a 
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dictionary. The bailiff did procure and provide the jury with 
a dictionary for the jury's use. Subsequently, it was learned 
that the jury used the dictionary to define the term 
"proximate" in order to understand the legal term "proximate 
cause." This fact was supported by a juro^ r affidavit. This 
consideration of extraneous material was clearly an 
irregularity which required the Court of Appeals to reverse the 
Judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. 
The case at hand is a perfect example of the dangers 
that can be encountered when the jury breaks off on its own to 
interpret the meaning of legal terms. In this case, the jury 
used the dictionary to define the term "proximate," a term 
already defined in the Court's instruction^ to the jury. 
Central to any negligence case is the issue of proximate 
cause. It is a term of art, a term used to express the concept 
of "legal cause." It is a term used to focus a jury's 
attention on the consideration of whether the defendant's 
conduct is "close" enough in the causal chain of events leading 
to the plaintiff's injuries to warrant the imposition of a 
legal duty upon the defendant. Any dictionary definition 
focusing on closeness in time or location is woefully 
inadequate and inherently misleading. The misleading effect of 
the dictionary definition is magnified in this case because of 
the relationship of the plaintiff's and the defendant's conduct 
in terms of closeness in time and distance. The dictionary 
definition of "proximate" could lead a reasonable juror to 
focus unduly on the closeness of time and distance in analyzing 
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proximate cause and therefore contaminate the deliberative 
process. This is so notwithstanding any particular juror's 
affidavit to the contrary, particularly in light of Rule 606(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which precludes affidavit 
testimony on the question of whether the extraneous material 
was actually prejudicial. 
The actual effect on the jury of looking up the word 
"proximate" in a dictionary is not discoverable. But, in light 
of the facts of the case and the law, this Court should 
conclude it is reasonable that the jury's verdict would be, and 
in fact was, affected by a layman's definition of a term so 
weighted with peculiarly legal baggage. Therefore, this Court 
should grant the defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals failed to adequately 
address the seat belt issue and the extraneous evidence 
issue. The seat belt issue in particular is an extremely 
important issue that should be decided by this Court as opposed 
to the Court of Appeals. The issue should be fully and 
properly briefed to this Court before any decision is made 
about whether or not seat belt testimony should be admitted and 
utilized by the trier of fact. The Court of Appeals' decision 
may in fact be contrary to the decision of this Court in 
Acculog, and is contrary to former Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-28-37. Further, as stated above, the question is such an 
important question of state law that it should be settled by 
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this Court and none other. Therefore, the 
defendant-appellant, William J. Lamborn, by and through his 
counsel, respectfully requests this Court to grant his Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ day of October, 
1987. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
 f 
the foregoing instrument was mailed; ifirGt class, postage ju*~*t oefi)ja*\ 
•propaid on this / ^ day of (-jOWr*Y^~ 1987, to the 
following counsel or record: 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Mark L. Anderson 
261 East 240 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HILLIER2/MMW 
jbpml0107 
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APPENDIX "A" 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Karen Hillier, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William J. Lamborn, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench and Orme. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860030-CA 
F I L E D 
AUG 5 1987 
Timothy M Shea 
GREENWOOD, J u d g e : Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant to 
recover for personal injury and property damage she suffered as 
a result of an automobile accident with defendant. The jury 
found defendant 80% negligent, plaintiff 20% negligent and 
awarded plaintiff $221,209.41 in damages. Defendant appeals 
seeking a new trial or a reduction in the damages. 
At about 8:30 a.m. on November 13, 1982, plaintiff was 
driving southbound on 1-15 near Farmington, Utah when 
defendant, who was driving south slowly on the right shoulder 
of the road, pulled out in front of her causing her to swerve 
sharply and her car to roll over. Plaintiff was thrown from 
the vehicle and suffered extensive injuries. 
The jury was instructed, over defendant's objection, on 
the sudden emergency doctrine which states in part that a 
person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly 
confronted with peril is not required to use the same judgment 
required in calmer moments. The court, however, refused to 
submit defendant's seat belt instruction to the jury and ruled 
that defendant would not be allowed to present any evidence 
regarding seat belts; ' Dirring jury deliberations one juror 
requested and received a dictionary from the bailiff for the 
purpose of defining "proximate" in order to understand 
-proximate cause." After the jury returned its verdict a 
judgment was entered. This appeal followed the court's denial 
of defendant's motion for a new trial or, alternatively, 
reduction of damages. 
On appeal defendant claims the trial court erred in: 1) 
submitting the sudden emergency instruction to the jury; 2) 
disallowing the seat belt instruction and evidence; 3) failing 
to grant a new trial due to the juror's use of a dictionary to 
define "proximate"; and 4) denying the motion for a new trial 
on the basis that the jury verdict was unreasonable and based 
on passion, prejudice and insufficient evidence. 
I 
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. 
Defendant argues the sudden emergency instruction was 
inappropriate because it requires plaintiff to be free of 
negligence. The instruction stated: 
A person, who without negligence on his 
part, is suddenly and unexpectedly 
confronted with peril arising from either 
the actual presence or the appearance of 
imminent danger to himself or to others is 
not expected nor required to use the same 
judgment and prudence that may be required 
of him in calmer and more deliberate 
moments. 
In such a situation, his duty is to 
exercise only the degree of care which an 
ordinary prudent person would exercise 
under the same or similar circumstances. 
If, at that moment, he exercises such 
care, he does all the law requires of him, 
even though in the light of after-events, 
it might appear that a difference choice 
and manner of action would have been 
better and safer. 
Defendant points out that plaintiff was not negligence free 
because the jury found her 20% negligent. Defendant also claims 
that plaintiff was necessarily negligent because she failed to 
move into the left lane when she first saw defendant's truck on 
the side of the road and a non-negligent person would have changed 
lanes. 
Plaintiff's theory of the case, on the other hand, was that 
she was not negligent for failing to anticipate defendant's act of 
pulling out in front of her. She claimed that defendant should 
have used his signal and looked behind him before pulling out into 
the right hand lane. Plaintiff asserts that the sudden emergency 
instruction was proper because it was consistent with her theory 
of the case. We agree. 
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The general rule is that a party is entitled to have his 
theory of the case submitted to the jury* Watters v. Ouerry, 
626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981). The trial court has a duty to 
••cover the theories and points of law of both parties in its 
instructions, provided there is competent evidence to support 
them.- Black v. McKnioht. 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court has examined the appropriateness 
of submitting a sudden emergency instruction to the jury in 
several cases. In Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 104 
Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943), Christiansen v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 649 P.2d 42 (Utah 1982) and Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 
170 (Utah 1983), the Court found no error in the trial court's 
submission of a sudden emergency instruction. 
In Redd, the Court found the instruction proper where the 
jury was not compelled by the evidence to conclude that 
defendant was driving without due care. Redd, 137 P.2d at 
378. Similarly, in Christiansen, the Court upheld a sudden 
emergency instruction despite the fact that the jury found both 
parties partially negligent. The Court reasoned that the 
instruction was proper because it was supported by some 
evidence and by one of the parties* theories. Christensen, 649 
P.2d at 47. Finally, in Anderson, the Court found no error 
where the sudden emergency instruction presented defendant's 
theory of the case that he had not acted negligently. 
Anderson, 671 P.2d at 174. 
In this case, plaintiff testified that she saw 
defendant's truck some distance south of her, entirely on the 
shoulder of the road, moving south slowly. She could not 
determine what defendant was doing but assumed he intended to 
slow the truck to a stop and park it. (In fact, defendant was 
"road hunting" for pheasants.) When she was four or five car 
lengths from him, he steered his truck into plaintiff's lane 
directly in front of her. It is undisputed that defendant did 
not signal before driving onto the road from the shoulder. 
Plaintiff's theory of the case was that she was not at fault 
for failing to anticipate defendant's negligence in pulling out 
in front of her. The trial court's submission of the sudden 
emergency instruction to the jury was in accordance with 
plaintiff's theory of the case and was supported by evidence 
presented at trial. The jury's ultimate determination that 
plaintiff was 20% negligent does not nullify the propriety of 
the instruction. Likewise, we reject defendant's contention 
that plaintiff was obviously negligent for failing to move into 
the left lane prior to passing defendant. Plaintiff was 
driving on a two-lane road and should not necessarily be 
- expected to cross the center line to avoid a car driving slowly 
on the shoulder. The question of plaintiff's negligence was a 
question of fact for the jury and the trial court could not 
conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff was negligent. 
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Defendant cites two Utah cases which he contends are 
indistinguishable from this case and dictate reversal of the 
trial courtfs denial of the motion for a new trial. In Solt v. 
qpflfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474 (Utah 1971) and Keller v, 
Shellev. 551 P.2d 513 (Utah 1976), the Court found as a matter 
of law that the sudden emergency or peril did not arise without 
fault by the defendants. In Solt. defendant, while driving his 
automobile, hit a two-year, eight month old child who followed 
a ball into the street. Defendant testified he was driving 30 
to 35 miles per hour when he observed the child come upon the 
roadway 60 to 80 feet in front of him. Defendant applied his 
brakes but was unable to avoid striking the child. Defendant 
did not contend that there was any sudden darting and the Court 
found the sudden emergency instruction improper due to the 
absence of evidence of a sudden or unexpected situation arising 
without the fault of defendant. The Court said the defendant 
saw what he should have seen all the time and was therefore 
negligent. The Court, in reversing, noted that "[u]nder the 
evidence given in this case it is difficult to see how the jury 
could have found for the defendant unless they were misled by 
some instructions given by the Court.M Solt, 479 P.2d at 476. 
The case before this Court differs from Solt in two 
important respects. First, in this case, plaintiff contends 
defendant's act of pulling out in front of her caused a sudden 
and unexpected situation, whereas in Solt, no such claim was 
made. Second, there is substantial difference between a child 
chasing a ball into the street and an adult in an automobile 
pulling out in front of another vehicle without signaling. A 
young child is reasonably likely to run into a street in front 
of a car. Conversely, an adult would reasonably be expected to 
first look behind him and signal before pulling into the road 
from the shoulder. 
Similarly, Keller involves a situation where no evidence 
was submitted to demonstrate a sudden and unexpected situation 
arising without fault on the part of the plaintiff. Keller, 
551 P.2d at 514. In Keller, defendant, while passing another 
vehicle, drove into the rear of plaintiffs vehicle. The Court 
recognized that a driver intending to pass another vehicle must 
be certain that he can safely pass the other vehicle. When 
defendant attempted to pass, plaintiff was stopped waiting for 
traffic to clear so she could make a left turn. The Court 
found the sudden emergency instruction improper because 
defendant was clearly negligent. Unlike Keller, in this case 
plaintiff was not undisputably negligent. Therefore, in light 
of plaintiff's evidence submitted at trial and her theory of 
the case, the instruction was proper. 
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II 
Defendant's next claim is that the trial court erred in 
refusing to allow evidence concerning plaintiff's failure to wear 
a seat belt and by failing to submit an instruction to the jury 
that nonuse of a seat belt may mitigate damages. 
A majority of other jurisdictions have held that evidence of 
nonuse of a seat belt on the issue of mitigation of damages is 
inadmissible. Britton v. Doehrina. 286 Ala. 498, 242 So.2d 666, 
671 (1970); Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 521 P.2d 161, 164 
(1974); Fischer v. Moore. 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458, 459 
(1973); Lipscomb v. Diamani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. 1967); 
McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 726 (D.C. 1976); Hampton v. State 
Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236, 248-49 (1972); 
Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett Ford. Inc., 135 Mich. App. 350, 354 
N.W.2d 336, 340 (1984); Miller v. Havnes, 454 S.W.2d 293, 300 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Selaado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 
579, 544 P.2d 719, 722 (1975); Fields v. Volkswagen, 555 P.2d 48, 
62 (Okla. 1976). We agree with the rationale of those cases and 
hold similarly that seat belt evidence is inadmissible in this 
case which arose prior to enactment of the present Utah statute.1 
Ill 
The third issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court 
erred in failing to grant a new trial due to the juror's2 use of 
a dictionary. According to affidavits submitted to the court, the 
jury, during deliberations, asked the bailiff for a dictionary to 
define MproximateM in order to understand "proximate cause."3 
The bailiff complied. 
Clearly the jury's request for a dictionary and consideration 
of HproximateH was improper and irregular. State v. Donald, 90 
Utah 533, 537, 63 P.2d 246, 248 (1936). The jury was instructed 
that Hit is your duty to follow the law as the court states it to 
you.M The proper procedure would have been for the jury to report 
the difficulty to the court and for the court to instruct the jury 
on the definition of "proximate". Id. 
1. At the time this case was tried, the legislature had not 
enacted Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-186 (1987) which provides that 
"failure to wear a seat belt does not constitute contributory or 
comparative negligence, and^may hot be introduced as evidence in 
any civil litigtion on the issue of injuries or on the issue of 
mitigation of damages." 
2. How many jurors used the dictionary is unclear. For 
simplicity we will refer to one juror. 
3. Both plaintiff and defendant submitted affidavits from 
different jurors regarding the use of the dictionary. 
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Despite the obvious improper conduct of the jury, such conduct 
must prejudice the substantial rights of defendant to warrant 
reversal. Id,: Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
In State v. Donald, the Utah Supreme Court held# in a 
forgery case, that a jury*s use of a dictionary to define 
"utter" did not prejudice the substantial rights of defendant 
and did not warrant reversal. The Court explained that even if 
the judge had instructed the jury on the definition of "utter" 
it would have been the same in substance as the dictionary 
definition read by the jury. 
In this case, the record does not contain the actual 
definition of ••proximate" the jury read nor identify the 
dictionary used. Without that definition we cannot compare the 
legal definition of "proximate cause" with the definition of 
"proximate" examined by the jury. In the absence of that 
crucial information, we do not find any basis for finding that 
substantial rights of defendant were prejudiced by the juror's 
reference to the dictionary. 
Plaintiff, who nonetheless saw fit to provide a 
counteraffidavit designed to diffuse the gravity of the juror's 
use of the dictionary, claims the trial court erred in 
considering the affidavit due to the restrictions imposed by 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(2). Rule 59(a)(2) states: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted . . . for any of 
the following causes . . . (2) Misconduct 
of the jury; and whenever any one or more 
of the jurors have been induced to assent 
to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them 
by the court, by resort to a determination 
by chance or as a result of bribery, such 
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
In several Utah cases, the Utah Supreme Court has 
interpreted Rule 59(a)(2) and held that the rule authorizes a 
jury verdict to be impeached by the affidavit of a juror only 
when the verdict was determined by chance or bribery. Rosenlof 
v. Sullivan. 676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1983); Groen v. 
TRI-O-INC., 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983); Smith v. Barnett, 17 
Utah 2d 240, 408 P.2d 709, 710 (1965). The policy behind the 
narrow interpretation of the law was set forth in Wheat v. 
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952): 
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To permit litigants to get jurors to sign 
affidavits or testify to matters discussed 
in connection with their functions as 
jurors would open the door to inquiry into 
all manner of things which a losing 
litigant might consider improper: 
misconceptions of evidence or law, offers 
of settlement, personal experiences, 
prejudice against litigants or their 
causes or the classes to which they 
belong. It would be an interminable and 
totally impracticable process. Such post 
mortems would be productive of no end of 
mischief and render service as a juror 
unbearable. If jurors were so 
circumscribed in their deliberations, it 
is likely that judge and counsel would 
have to be present in the jury room 
attempting to monitor and regulate their 
thought and discussions into approved 
channels. 
Id. at 937. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted 
59(a)(2) and limited the circumstances under which jury affidavits 
may be admitted into evidence, the Court also adopted the Utah 
Rules of Evidence on April 13, 1983 and made them effective as of 
September 1, 1983. Under Utah R. Evid. 606(b) "a juror may testify 
on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside 
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.M The 
Court's adoption of Rule 606(b) indicates an intent to allow juror 
affidavits into evidence under the circumstances described in 
606(b). In effect, Rule 606(b) provides another exception to the 
general rule that juror affidavits are inadmissible. 
Applying 606(b) to the facts of this case, the dictionary was 
"extraneous information." Clearly, the judge did not give the 
dictionary to the jury. Whether it was "prejudicial" was dependent 
upon the definition examined by the jury. Because a question 
existed as to whether or. not use of the dictionary was 
"prejudicial," both affidavits were admissible under 606(b). 
IV 
Finally, defendant argues that the jury verdict was 
unreasonable and was based on passion, prejudice and insufficient 
evidence. Juries are given wide discretion in assessing damages. 
Amoss v. Broadbent, 30 Utah 2d 165, 514 P.2d 1284, 1287 (1973). 
When a jury determines a question of fact, its verdict will not be 
disturbed if it is supported by any competent evidence. Time 
Commercial Financing Corp. v. Davis, 657 P.2d 234, 236 (Utah 
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1982); Uintah Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1976); Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Utah 
1975). Further, this Court will defer to the jury's verdict unless 
it is "so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to 
clearly indicate passion, prejudice or corruption." McAfee v. 
Oaden Union Rv. & Depot Co., 62 Utah 115, 129, 218 P. 98, 104 
(1923). 
The record indicates that the jury's verdict is supported by 
competent evidence. Further, the damages awarded are not 
shockingly excessive in light of the extensive injuries suffered by 
plaintiff. 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ' •- 1,/^  * ,* , 
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Karen Hillier, 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
William J. Lamborn, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
V, - - a * 
V0 <\ 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FQR REHEARING ^ ' 
Case No. 860C30-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Defendant/ 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing in the above captioned matter, 
and the Court having duly considered said petition, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant/Appellant's Petition 
for Rehearing be denied. 
Dated this 25th day of August, 1987. 
FOR THE COURT: 
riinothy M. Snea Tirfi t  . h  
Clerk of t h e Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING by depositing the 
same in the United States mail/ postage prepaid to the following: 
Gary B. Ferguson# Esq. 
Michael K. Mohrman# Esq. 
Richards, Brandt/ Miller & Nelson 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main/ P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City# UT 84110 
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq. 
Mark L. Anderson, Esq. 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South/ 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this 27th day of August/ 1987< 
nt(lA 
Karen Bean 
Case"Management Clerk 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KAREN HILLIER, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. LAMBORN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S EX PARTE 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Case No. 860030-CA 
Appellant, William J. Lamborn, by and through his 
counsel of record, Michael K. Mohrman, hereby moves this Court 
pursuant to Rule 45(e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, to 
extend appellants time for filing a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari from September 25, 1987 up to and including October 
9, 1987. 
As good cause for this Motion, appellant alleges as 
follows: 
1. The Order denying appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
was entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on August 26, 1987. 
Therefore, time for filing appellant's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari has not yet expired. 
2. Counsel for appellant, Michael K. Mohrman, was 
preparing for and participated in a two-week trial beginning 
September 8, 1987. This trial, before Third District Judge Scott 
Daniels, is entitled Pickhover v. Smith's Management Inc., 
et al., Civil No. C85-4307. 
3. Due to this trial, with its necessary preparation, 
appellant's counsel was unable to file his Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari with this Court. 
4. Appellant seeks fourteen (14) day extension, and no 
prior Request for Extension Time has been filed. 
DATED this <sAj? day of September, 1987. 
RICHARD^, BRANDT, MILLER 
&^ NELSON 
CERTIFICATE OF 
Wd/\/ 
MI CffAELJC^MQHPMAN 
—Att^irney^for Appellant 
D-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was hand-delivered on this ^ ^ 7 day of 
September, 1987 to the following counsel of record: 
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq. 
Mark L. Anderson, Esq. 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KAREN HILLIER, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
WILLIAM J. LAMBORN, 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
| ORDER GRANTING APPELLANT'S | MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME | TO FILE WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
I Case No. 860030-CA 
This matter having come before the Court upon 
defendant's/appellant's Motion for Extension of Time to File a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the above-captioned 
matter, and the Court having duly considered said Motion, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's/appellantfs 
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari be granted and that the time for filing said 
Petition be extended up to and including October 9, 1987. 
DATED this day of September, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Supreme Court Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was hand-delivered on this o^2> day of 
September, 1987 to the following counsel of record: 
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq. 
Mark L. Anderson, Esq. 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HILLIER2/TAMI 
iuMd/C/ 
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APPENDIX »C" 
728 Utah 692 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ACCULOG, INC., a Colorado corporation, 
Robert Pflster and Kenton Shaw, co-
partners d/b/a Acculog Field Services, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Keith PETERSON, d/b/a Peterson 
Ford, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 18133. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1984. 
In a suit for destruction of plaintiffs 
van and logging equipment by fire, alleged-
ly caused by defendants negligence, plain-
tiff appealed from judgment of the Seventh 
District Court, Grand County, George E. 
Ballif, J. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that: (1) where it was found that van 
had been negligently serviced and that 
such negligence was proximate cause of 
fire and damage sustained, plaintiffs' fail-
ure to carry fire extinguisher in van was 
not contributing factor in causing injury, 
and trial court erred in submitting to jury 
the question of plaintiffs' comparative neg-
ligence, and (2) plaintiffs loss of profits 
calculated at $33,122.40 was meticulously 
supported by exhibits documenting gross 
profits, deducting expenses not incurred 
when contracts were lost, and deriving net 
loss of profits from difference between the 
two, and there was sufficient evidentiary 
basis for jury to have determined the issue. 
Judgment on special verdict vacated, 
and case remanded for new trial. 
Oaks, J., filed concurring opinion. 
1. Negligence G»97 
Ultimate facts in comparative negli-
gence case embrace only negligence, causa-
tion and percentages of negligence attrib-
uted to plaintiff and defendant, and a plain-
tiff cannot be held to be contributorily neg-
ligent unless his negligence is causally con-
nected to the plaintiffs injury. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-27-37. 
2. Negligence ®=>97 
Only where plaintiffs negligent con-
duct was contributing factor in causing in-
jury does comparative negligence become 
defense for defendant. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-
37. 
3. Automobiles <S»368 
Where it was found that van had been 
negligently serviced and that such negli-
gence was proximate cause of fire and 
damage sustained, plaintiffs' failure to 
carry fire extinguisher in van was not con-
tributing factor in causing injury, and trial 
court erred in submitting to jury the ques-
tion of plaintiffs' comparative negligence. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37. 
4. Damages <§=>5, 184 
Generally, all damages, special or gen-
eral, causally connected to party's tortious 
actions are recoverable, and although evi-
dence must not be so indefinite as to allow 
jury to speculate as to their amount, some 
degree of uncertainty is tolerable. 
5. Damages <3=>190 
In suit for negligence causing plain-
tiffs' van and logging unit to be destroyed 
by fire, plaintiffs loss of profits calculated 
at $33,122.40 was meticulously supported 
by exhibits documenting gross profits, de-
ducting expenses not incurred when con-
tracts were lost, and deriving net loss of 
profits from difference between the two, 
and there was sufficient evidentiary basis 
for jury to have determined the issue. 
Paul W. Mortensen, Harry E. Snow, 
Moab, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Nelson E. Hayes, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiffs Acculog appeal from a judg-
ment of "no cause of action" which was 
entered after a jury returned a special ver-
dict. Acculog's 1977 four-wheel-drive Ford 
E250 Quadravan, estimated at a value of 
$7,000, caught fire and was destroyed later 
in the same day that defendant Peterson 
Ford had installed a new fuel filter to cor-
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rect overheating in the engine Also de-
stro\ ed in the fire was Acculog s geological 
equipment consisting of a Mount Sopns 
bore-hole logging unit mounted on the vehi-
cle and stipulated to have a value of $41,-
687 95 Acculog claimed that the destruc-
tion of the van and equipment resulted in a 
loss of profits estimated by it at over $33,-
000 On the day of the fire Acculog did not 
carrv a fire extinguisher in its van 
At trial, Peterson Ford moved for a di-
rected verdict in its favor at the end of 
Acculog's case on the issue of lost profits 
The motion was based on the ground that 
plaintiffs had failed to prove the loss of 
any profits under binding contracts The 
motion was granted on that ground and on 
the further ground added b\ the court that 
there was no evidence before the jury what 
the amount of the profits would have been 
At the end of the trial Acculog excepted 
to a special verdict form on the ground that 
there was no evidence to support submit-
ting the question of comparative and con-
tributory negligence to the jur\, Acculog 
also asked the trial court to instruct Peter-
son Ford not to argue to the jury that the 
absence of a fire extinguisher constituted 
negligence on its part as an\ such negli-
gence was not relevant to causation of the 
fire The court noted that it had difficulty 
with that issue as it seemed to be a ques-
tion of mitigation of damages However, 
the amount of damages had been stipulated 
to by the parties and the court determined 
that it could not therefore instruct on miti-
gation Plaintiffs' request was denied by 
the court with a comment that the jury 
"would be looking at [the absence of a fire 
extinguisher] from the standpoint of it be-
ing maybe just another one of the elements 
that ended up m causing the fire " That 
argument was made by the defense to the 
jury 
The special verdict contained five inter-
rogatories 
1 Was the defendant negligent m the 
manner of servicing plaintiffs' van on 
June 28, 1979? 
2 If your answer to Question No 1 is 
"yes," then answer the following ques-
tion Was such negligence a proximate 
cause of the fire and damage sustained 
by plaintiffs on said date7 
3 Was [sic] the plaintiffs negligent at 
the time of the fire m question on June 
28, 1979? 
If your answer to Question No 3 is 
"yes," then answer the following ques-
tion 
4 Was such negligence a proximate 
cause of the fire and damage sustained 
by plaintiffs on said date? 
5 If vou have answered all the previ-
ous questions "yes," then and only then, 
are you to answer this question 
Taking the combined negligence that 
caused the damage as one hundred per-
cent (100%), what percentage of that neg-
ligence was atnbutable [sic] to the plain-
tiffs and what percentage was attributa-
ble to the defendant7 
(a) Percentage attributable to defend-
ant7 
(b) Percentage attributable to plaintiffs7 
TOTAL 100% 
During deliberation the jury delivered a 
note to the trial court that they could not 
answer questions 2 and 4 as "they appear 
to be two-part questions that we cannot 
answer with a singular answer " The trial 
court responded "you must answer either 
yes or no to each of the questions referred 
to above Consult the instructions I can-
not help you further" Questions Nos 1 
through 4 were answered m the affirma-
tive Question No 5 attributed 14 percent 
negligence to the defendant and 86 percent 
negligence to the plaintiffs 1 
Acculog's points on appeal can be re-
duced to two major issues (1) Was it error 
for the trial court to refuse to direct a 
verdict in favor of Acculog on the issue of 
plaintiffs' comparative negligence7 (2) 
Was it error for the trial court to direct a 
verdict in favor of Peterson Ford on the 
issue of loss of profits7 
1. "These percentages seem to closelv parallel the stipulated damages to the equipment of $41, 
estimated value of the truck of $7,000 and the 687 95 
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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
Utah's comparative negligence statute, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37, provides that the 
contributory negligence of a person shall 
not bar the recovery of damages "for negli-
gence . . . resulting in death or injury to 
person or property, if such negligence was 
not as great as the negligence . . . of the 
person against whom recovery is sought 
" The question posed therefore is 
whether plaintiffs' alleged negligence, their 
failure to carry a fire extinguisher in the 
van, caused "injury" to their own property, 
and whether a jury instruction on plain-
tiffs' negligence was proper under the .cir-
cumstances of this case. 
[1,2] The ultimate facts in a compara-
tive negligence case embrace only negli-
gence, causation and the percentages of 
negligence attributed to plaintiff and de-
fendant. Marcus v. Cortese, 98 N.M. 414, 
649 P.2d 482 (App.1982). A plaintiff can-
not be held to be contributorily negligent 
unless his negligence is causally connected 
to the plaintiff's injury. Boeke v. Interna-
tional Paint Co. (Cal.)> Inc., 27 Wash.App. 
611, 620 P.2d 103 (1980); Kennedy v. City 
of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 
(1980). From its inception comparative 
negligence law has been so construed that 
once the combined negligence of plaintiff 
and defendant in causing the injury to the 
plaintiff is established, it is within the prov-
ince of the trier of fact to apportion fault 
or causation. Brown v. Haertel, 210 Wis. 
345, 244 N.W. 630 (1932). In other words, 
where plaintiff's negligent conduct was a 
contributing factor in causing the injury, 
comparative negligence becomes a defense 
for the defendant. 
[3] Here there was no evidence present-
ed at trial that Acculog in any way caused 
the fire. The jury found that Peterson 
Ford had negligently serviced the van and 
that its negligence was a proximate cause 
of the fire and damage sustained by Accu-
log. (Interrogatories 1 and 2.) The jury 
also found Acculog to have been negligent 
in causing the fire and damage. (Inter-
rogatories 3 and 4.) When faced with ap-
portioning negligence, the jury was asked 
to take the combined negligence that 
caused the damage and apportion it be-
tween the two parties. (Interrogatory 5.) 
Testimony at the trial made it clear that 
Acculog could have prevented the spread 
of the fire from the engine <j)f the van to 
the logging equipment had a fire extin-
guisher been available, but that should not 
have been the question presented to the 
jury. We are not concerned in comparative 
negligence law with the cause of the dam-
age, but with the cause of the injury in-
stead. 
The term "injury" is sometimes used in 
the sense of i'damage," as including the 
harm or loss for which compensation is 
sought, and has been defined as damage 
resulting from an unlawful act; but in 
strict legal significance, there is, proper-
ly speaking, a material distinction be-
tween the two terms, in that injury 
means something done against the right 
of the party, producing damage, whereas 
damage is the harm, detriment, or loss 
sustained by reason of the injury. 
Clark v. Cassetty, 71 N.M. 89, 376 P.2d 37 
(1962). 
The special verdict form in the case un-
der review combined in interrogatories 2 
and 4 injury and damage as one element of 
the tort. The jury was confused and re-
quested clarification. The confusion was 
compounded when in interrogatory 5 an 
apportionment was requested on cause of 
damage. In Kelley v. Capital Motors, 204 
S.C. 304, 28 S.E.2d 836 (1944), a case in-
versely apposite here, plaintiff sued de-
fendant for loss of his car in a fire originat-
ing outside defendant's premises. Defend-
ant moved for a directed verdict on the 
ground that his failure to have a sprinkler 
system and fire extinguishers on the prem-
ises bore no causal connection to the de-
struction of plaintiff's car. The trial court 
denied the motion and defendant appealed. 
Finding no causal connection between de-
fendant's negligence and plaintiffs loss. 
the appeals court stated: 
On the issue of proximate cause, we are 
of the opinion that the only reasonable 
inference warranted by the record is that 
the proximate, direct 
cause of the loss of [plaintiff's] automo-
bile was a fire which broke out and com-
menced on premises over which [defend-
ant] had no control, and which . . . spread 
to [defendant's] sales room and repair 
garage. 
Likewise in the case under review, the 
proximate, direct and immediate cause of 
the loss of Acculog's van and equipment 
was a fire which broke out in the engine 
through no fault of Acculog's and spread 
to the logging unit. Peterson Ford did not 
have the defense of plaintiffs' comparative 
negligence. The trial court expressed the 
opinion that there might be a question of 
mitigation of damages, but that issue is not 
before us and we decline to address it. 
We hold that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in submitting to the jury 
the question of plaintiffs' comparative neg-
ligence. 
LOSS OF PROFITS 
On motion of the defendant, the trial 
court directed a verdict against plaintiffs 
on the issue of lost profits because they did 
not produce evidence that they had entered 
into any binding contracts which they were 
unable to perform when they lost their van 
and equipment. The court also based its 
ruling on the ground that on the evidence 
then before the court, the jury could not 
have concluded what the profit on any job 
would have been. Defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict was supported by its 
argument that lost profits could not be 
based upon an understanding between Ac-
culog and Amoco (one of its customers) 
that did not rise to the level of a legally 
binding contract. Defendant misperceives 
the test. Acculog was not seeking lost 
profits resulting from the breach of con-
tract by a contracting party. Damages 
were claimed in an action sounding in tort 
against a noncontracting party. 
[4] The general rule that all damages, 
whether special or general, which are caus-
ally connected to a party's tortious actions 
are recoverable was restated in ERA Heli-
copters, Inc. v. Digicon Alaska, Inc., Alas-
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and immediate ka, 518 P.2d 1057 (1974). In that case a 
survey company suffered losses when a 
helicopter company damaged a gravity me-
ter which it used to conduct gravity and 
seismic surveys in the Norton Sound region 
of Alaska, not dissimilar to the type of 
work engaged in by Acculog in the instant 
case. The survey company based its claim 
for damages to property and for business 
disruption on the helicopter company's neg-
ligence. Survey work was halted for 25 
days until a new gravity meter could be 
obtained. The trial court gave the follow-
ing jury instruction: 
If you find that the loss of the gravity 
meter was proximately caused by the 
negligence of the [helicopter company] 
you may award as damages to the plain-
tiff such amount as will compensate for 
the business interruption, including but 
not limited to the standby time of the 
crew aboard the vessel and the costs 
related to the delay in completion of the 
seismographic work for the client of 
plaintiff. 
Two complementary instructions dealt with 
a party's duty to avoid loss and minimize 
damages, and with damages proximately 
resulting from the wrongful act. The re-
viewing court upheld those instructions and 
damages awarded thereunder as proper. 
Again, the measure of damages for loss of 
use of property was set out in State v. 
Stanley, Alaska, 506 P.2d 1284 (1973). 
Stanley had lost his crab fishing boat as a 
result of the state's negligence. Damages 
were awarded for loss of use for 18 
months, the period required to replace the 
vessel. After recognizing the general ob-
jective of tort law to place an injured per-
son in a position as nearly as possible to 
the position he would have occupied but for 
the defendant's tort, the court applied that 
objective to the loss of a vessel: "[T]he 
damages would be the vessel's share of 
gross earnings reasonably anticipated for 
the period involved, . . . less the expendi-
tures which would have been chargeable to 
the owner." Id. at 1293. 
We have recognized that lost profits may 
be recovered when the evidence submitted 
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provides a basis for estimating them with 
reasonable certainty. While the evidence 
must not be so indefinite as to allow the 
jury to speculate as to their amount, some 
degree of uncertainty is tolerable. Cook 
Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, Utah, 664 
P.2d 1161 (1983); Penelko, Inc. v. John 
Price Assocs., Inc., Utah, 642 P.2d 1229 
(1982); Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distribu-
tors, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 1303 (1979); dic-
tum in Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Utah 2d 
183, 515 P.2d 442 (1973); Security Devel-
opment Company v. Fedco, Inc., 23 Utah 
2d 306, 462 P.2d 706 (1969). Cf. Jenkins v. 
Morgan, 123 Utah 480, 260 P.2d 532 (1953). 
[5] Under the above authorities, the tri-
al court erred in directing a verdict against 
Acculog on the issue of lost profits. Accu-
log produced as a witness Amoco's geolo-
gist who was in charge of all bidding and 
who had accepted Acculog's bid on two 
jobs. He testified that during his employ-
ment with Amoco, no bid accepted by him 
had ever been rejected by the officer autho-
rized to contractually bind Amoco. Accu-
log had to withdraw those bids when it 
could not timely replace its logging unit. 
Plaintiffs calculated their loss of profits at 
$33,122.40. That amount was meticulously 
supported by exhibits documenting gross 
profits, deducting expenses not incurred 
when the contracts were lost, and deriving 
the net loss of profits from the difference 
between the two. Thus there was laid an 
evidentiary basis for the jury to have deter-
mined the issue. In this instance, we ex-
imine the evidence in the light most favor-
ible to the losing party, and when there is 
i reasonable basis in the evidence and in 
he inferences to be drawn therefrom that 
vould support a judgment in favor of the 
Dsing party the directed verdict cannot be 
ustained. Management Committee v. 
Waystone Pines, Utah, 652 P.2d 896 
1982). 
The judgment on the special verdict is 
acated and the case remanded for a new 
ial. Costs are awarded to the plaintiffs. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
OAKS, Justice (concurring): 
I concur in the Court's opinion, but be-
lieve that instead of reserving judgment on 
the effect of plaintiff's "failure to mitigate 
damages," this Court should give guidance 
on how the district court should handle the 
issue of apportionment of damages on the 
new trial. 
Our comparative negligence statute, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37, only applies to 
negligence "resulting in death or in injury 
to person or property " The "resulting 
. . . injury" referred to in this section is the 
accident, in this case, the fire. - Consequent-
ly, as the main opinion holds, only negli-
gence that caused the fire is properly com-
pared under the statute. 
Negligence that only contributed to the 
harm, detriment, or loss sustained by rea-
son of the accident is also relevant and 
should be given effect before money dam-
ages are finally apportioned. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 465 comment c (1965). 
In the context of our comparative negli-
gence statute, this requires a two-step pro-
cess, as follows: 
First, the negligence of plaintiff and de-
fendant that resulted in the accident are 
compared, in the manner and with the ef-
fect specified in § 78-27-37. That is, the 
trier of fact determines the amount of dam-
ages the plaintiff would be allowed to re-
cover (independent of damages caused by 
his failure to mitigate or avoid damages;, 
and that amount is then "diminished in the 
proportion to the amount of negligence^ [ih 
causing the accident] attributable to |the 
[plaintiff]." This step exhausts the effect 
of the comparative negligence statute. 
Second, the amount of damages (the 
plaintiff would be allowed to recover untie-
the first step is subjected to a further 
reduction dictated by the common-law rfth 
of mitigation of damages or what the fc(-
statement calls "the damages rule as to 
avoidable consequences " RestaU • 
ment (Second) of Torts, § 465 commenj 
(1965). This reduction, on which the <jK-
fendant has the burden of proof, applr-
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where the plaintiff is found to have been 
negligent in failing to mitigate or avoid 
damages and where this negligence is 
found to have increased his total damages 
beyond what he would have suffered if he 
had not been negligent in this manner. 
The reduction under this step is the per-
centage of the total damages that is at-
tributable to plaintiffs negligence in fail-
ing to mitigate or avoid damages. 
The two-step process specified here is the 
one described and applied by the North 
Dakota Supreme Court in Halvorson v. 
Voeller, N.D., 336 N.W.2d 118 (1983), a 
well-reasoned opinion to which reference is 
made for further discussion. The process 
is illustrated in that court's example, quot-
ed in the footnote.1 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 5> 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover 
for injuries sustained while a guest passen-
ger in a jeep operated by defendant that 
rolled over while attempting an off-road 
hill climb. 
The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant in reliance upon 
the Guest Statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 41-9-1. 
Plaintiff appeals, and defendant cross-ap-
peals the court's denial of his motion to 
dismiss a second cause of action based on 
intoxication and willful misconduct. 
Malxxn v. -Lewis,- Utah,-693-P.2d-661 
(1984), determines the Guest Statute to be 
unconstitutional. We therefore vacate the 
judgment of the trial court and remand this 
case for trial. No costs awarded. 
STEWART, HOWE, OAKS and DUR-
HAM, JJ., concur. 
Douglas BOTTOMS, Plaintiff, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent, 
( O | KEY NUMBER SY«,TEM> 
Scott O. HUNSAKER, Defendant, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 17775. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1984. 
Appeal from Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County; James S. Sawaya, Judge. 
John L. Black, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff, appellant and cross-respondent. 
Roger H. Bullock, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant, respondent and cross-appellant. 
1. Assume: X driving a car, and Y, driving a 
motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not wear-
ing a helmet. The jury finds X is 60 percent 
liable for causing the accident [the "injury" 
under § 78-27-37], making Y, the motorcy-
clist, 40 percent liable for causing the acci-
dent. The jury also finds Y would have avoid-
ed 60 percent of his injuries [damages] if he 
had worn a helmet; X is 40 percent liable for 
causing Y's [damages]. Y proves $100,000 in 
damages. 
Melissa BUNKER, By and Through her 
general guardian, Karen MECHAM, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Ted MOHLMAN, Defendant-Respondent. 
No. 17286. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1984. 
Appeal from Fourth District Court, Utah 
County; David Sam, Judge. 
On the basis of these findings, the $100,000 
award should be reduced by 40 percent, 
which accounts for Y's contributing to the 
cause of the accident. Hence, the award is 
diminished to $60,000. 
The $60,000 should now be reduced to the 
extent that Y's [damages] would have been 
[avoided] had he worn a helmet, i.e., 60 per-
cent. This adjustment leaves a total award of 
$24,000. 
Id. at 121-22 n. 2. 
